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The role of the state in the Great Divergence 
There is an old and perhaps not very tasteful English proverb which says 
that ‘there is more than one way to skin a cat’. Perhaps its meaning is 
obvious. In this case the ‘cat’ a very agile and elusive one – is global history. 
We can all recognize the value, the importance, even, perhaps, the necessity, 
of writing global history: first to acknowledge our interdependence as 
‘national’ communities. Second, to recognize the significance over the very 
longue durée of macro-processes like migration, religious conversion, 
commercial exchange and even climate change.  And third, more 
immediately, to explain (however provisionally) our current situation in a 
‘globalised’ world. But how to study, let alone how to write, global history is 
not so straightforward. In the second part of this short paper, I consider 
some of the angles from which it can be approached, but also the 
shortcomings and difficulties from which each seems to suffer. 
 My own approach in After Tamerlane1 was more one of bricolage than 
of grand design or theoretical sophistication. It was driven by curiosity 
about one large but also rather simple question: why did one part of Eurasia 
came to dominate the rest? Of course that question could hardly be asked 
without considering two ‘supplementary’ issues: domination on what terms, 
and domination for how long? In trying to answer it, I framed a series of 
general arguments, as well as several assertions, each of them open to 
challenge, and perhaps refutation. Let us begin begin with the assertions. 
The book claims that the ‘world-island’ (Mackinder’s phrase) of Eurasia has 
to be seen as the pivot of world (and global) history, and its decisive arena. 
This is not a pronouncement that historians of the Americas, sub-Saharan 
Africa or the Pacific are likely to echo. It is also at odds with the long 
tradition of studying European expansion into the ‘outer world’ as the 
engine of world history. But it is based on the conclusion that in any long 
view of world history the relations between Western, Middle and Eastern 
Eurasia – that is, Europe, the Islamic world and East Asia – are the master-
key to explaining the distribution of wealth, power and cultural affiliation 
across the globe as a whole. If this seems far-fetched, consider what 
difference it made that China had rejected a maritime ‘destiny’ by 1430; that 
                                                     






the British took command of the imperial assets of India from the late 
eighteenth century; that Russia emerged from its Muscovite margins to 
become the overlord of Inner North Asia between 1550 and 1860.   
 The second assertion is perhaps just as contentious. The book also 
claims that empire has been the ‘default mode’ of political organization for 
much of recorded history, and should not be treated, as historians often 
imply, as an aberration or exception in the course of world history. It is the 
‘norm’. By contrast, the nation-state model is a recent and perhaps only 
short-lived experiment. That is not to say that empire is desirable: perhaps 
most of us would prefer to live in the civilized intimacy of the Kleinstaat 
imagined by Jacob Burckhardt.2 But circumstances have usually favoured 
the agglomeration of power by ruling groups or states whose reach has 
extended far beyond the bounds set by language, ethnicity, religion or 
natural environment, the usual markers of a ‘national’ political identity. 
Hence, the struggles for domination in Eurasia are not to be seen as a result 
of individual perversity (the work of madmen, despots and tyrants), or as 
the peculiar sin of European imperialists. Instead they reflect the highly 
unpredictable consequences of unequal commercial, cultural and 
demographic exchange and the still greater uncertainties of warfare and 
diplomacy. Set inside the larger frame of the relations between Western, 
Middle and Eastern Eurasia, is thus a history of empire-building within but 
also across those ‘civilisational’ divides. The book said less than it should 
have about how empire should be defined. That is partly because (in the 
writer’s view) its vital characteristic – the commanding influence (by rule, 
treaty or force) by one ethnic group (or elite) over several other ethnicities – 
is what makes it so commonplace. Most of the additional features that 
historians have lovingly piled up around empire are merely ornamental, that 
do more to obscure than reveal the fundamentals of power.   
 
What of the arguments? The book advances four general propositions. The 
first rejects the so-called ‘age of discoveries’ as the decisive moment of 
change in Europe’s relations with the rest of Eurasia. It argues instead that 
the drama of Europe’s maritime expansion and its internal transformation 
in an era of state-building were matched by the early modern expansion and 
renovation of the states of Middle and Eastern Eurasia. Indeed, Ottoman 
expansion into Europe suggested that reports of the Europeans’ global 
supremacy were at best premature. It was certainly true that Europeans 
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displayed greater navigational expertise and adventure than sea-goers in 
Asia, as well as more general curiosity about other parts of Eurasia than 
Muslims or Chinese were to show about Europe. But it remained the case 
through the early modern period up until circa 1750 that all the main 
civilizations of Eurasia remained on a broadly equal footing judged in terms 
of their economic autonomy (but not necessarily their long-term capacity); 
their political independence; and their cultural self-confidence. Europeans 
might have cruised and traded along the coasts of Asia, travelled far inland 
and encountered Asian rulers and scholars. But though they were 
sometimes dismissive of their hosts’ mechanical skills and political ethos, 
very few of them thought that the assertion of European primacy over the 
Ottomans, Iranians, Mughals, Qing or Tokogawa was remotely likely. And 
for very good reasons. 
 The second proposition is that when this change began to take place, 
its causes have to be sought not just in the realm of economic capacity (the 
industrial revolution), but in the interplay between geopolitical, economic 
and cultural developments and between European and Asian initiatives. The 
‘great commercialisation’ in eighteenth-century Eurasia might have served 
as a catalyst. But a series of unpredictable geopolitical disturbances in 
Europe and South Asia between 1755 and 1815 shaped much of the 
outcome and created a ‘new world’ in which some European states (Britain 
and Russia especially) could exert far greater pressure in distant parts of 
Eurasia than had been faintly conceivable before 1750. What role the ‘long 
Enlightenment’ played in this process – and in the ‘Great Divergence’ more 
generally has been fiercely and so far inconclusively debated. Did 
Europeans enjoy an intellectual advantage over other Eurasians by 1750, in 
terms of their access to reliable and useable knowledge? Perhaps to some 
extent, yes. But the argument here is that without geopolitical change it 
would not have been easy to put this into much use as a weapon of 
Europe’s pre-eminence over other cultures in Eurasia. 
 The third proposition is that the full effects of Europe’s ‘rise to 
power’ were not to be felt until the mid-nineteenth century when the 
communications revolution brought by steam and electric and the arrival of 
a true global economy coincided with the rapidly widening gap between the 
technological resources of the most advanced Western states and those of 
Asian states and empires. But even when Europe’s relative power was at its 
greatest, it was not enough to ensure the real domination of Asia. In China, 
the Ottoman Empire, Iran, in colonial India and above all in Japan, the 





time when (to many Europeans) it seemed as if Europe’s triumph was 
almost complete. Just how dependent Europe’s Eurasian authority was 
upon the mutual restraint of Europe’s great powers and a tacit doctrine of 
‘competitive coexistence’ between them was revealed by the First World 
War and its turbulent aftermath.  
The fourth proposition follows directly from this. Because Europe’s 
domination was never complete, and its imperial power was (in many 
places) quite shallow, when its power finally lapsed in the Second World 
War there was no unified or europeanised world to bequeath to the ‘great 
inheritor’, the United States. It was, on the contrary, a world splintered by 
resistance, nationalism, ideological conflict and wars of succession and then 
pulled apart by the effects of cold war. And despite globalization (and the 
end of the Cold War), much of that legacy remains to this day. 
 
Whatever the merits (or otherwise!) of the arguments of the book, it is plain 
that its method and approach could be challenged from several stand- 
points. One of the more obvious objections is that global history, and the 
attempt to explain its central puzzle the ‘Great Divergence’ between Europe 
and Asia requires a systematic comparison between the states and societies 
that ‘succeeded’ in the ‘great transformation’ and those that ‘fell behind’. 
The historian should not rely upon an impressionistic account of 
performance and capacity but study in detail the range of key institutions, 
behaviours and beliefs whose collective divergence might explain the overall 
outcome. Thus forms of government and their relative efficiencies; the 
nature of legal regimes and their treatment of property and personhood; 
social attitudes to knowledge and science and the institutional forms for 
their collection and diffusion; the nature of class and other social 
distinctions (including ethnicity), their openness or rigidity; the nature of 
religious beliefs, not least in relation to science, and the degree of toleration 
permitted; as well the familiar indicators of economic performance: all 
require close comparative study to trace why and when their characteristics 
diverged, and with what wider effects. Once the results of enquiry have 
been gathered and analysed, we might venture a more confident statement 
of the causes of divergence, and the drive-motor of world history. 
Indeed we might. But we might also blanch at the scale of the task 
involved. Such an enormous research programme would require many 
hands. But quite apart from the need to coordinate the various lines of 
enquiry, systematic comparison would raise a number of difficult 
methodological issues. For what periods of history, or for what groups of 




years would comparative study be most fruitful and appropriate? What 
states or societies should be the targets of investigation? What criteria 
should we use to decide on both questions? Given the problem that the 
sources available for most of the key topics vary enormously in different 
parts of the world, how can we compensate for the inevitable unevenness in 
the coverage possible? Indeed, at what point might we say that no 
comparison can be valid where the data is so scanty? Even if we succeed in 
piling up a huge mound of reliable data, what will it tell us? The vital issue 
will be: which sphere(s) of activity among those we have examined have 
exerted a critical impact on the historical trajectory of a country or region? 
But how can we tell? And even if we agree on the critical factors for one 
part of the world, can we be sure that the same causal relationship holds for 
all the others as well? Almost certainly not.   
A second approach is to discard systematic comparison in favour of 
‘big history’: the macro-processes which, it seems plausible to think, have 
shaped global history over the longue durée. There are plenty of candidates. 
Among those that have been most favoured by historians are the 
‘gunpowder revolution’, the ‘military revolution’, the Enlightenment, the 
Industrial Revolution, the ‘high imperialism’ of the late nineteenth century, 
the ‘world revolutions’ of the twentieth, and decolonization. It is perfectly 
true that each of these would make a fascinating chapter in a textbook 
account of global history since 1400. But questions quickly arise. What 
principle of selection will help us to choose which macro-processes to 
study? After all, there are plenty of others that might deserve our attention. 
Should we not also consider the demographic revolutions that have changed 
the balance between different parts of the world? And what of the 
agricultural revolution that transformed British and European agriculture, 
and eventually much of the world’s? Jan de Vries’3 ‘Industrious Revolution’, 
and the atomic revolution of 1945 could make a strong case for inclusion. 
So could the phenomenon of religious conversion and the missionary 
movements – Christian, Muslim and other – that have changed the cultures 
of continents. What about climate change and the effects of disease, the 
uneasy relations between plagues and peoples so brilliantly evoked by 
William McNeill. Even if we could agree upon the full list of macro-
processes that have structured world history, what chance would we have of 
deciding on their relative importance? Or would we have to fall back on a 
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lame consensus that they were all ‘significant’? And are we to treat them as 
distinct and separate phenomena? If not (and it would be implausible), how 
should they be related? Are we anywhere near forging the methodologies 
needed to find the connections and measure the ‘weight’ of outwardly 
impressive ‘revolutions’ – some of which (like the ‘military revolution’) have 
been wildly exaggerated? 
The third ‘grand strategy’ to which global historians have been 
attracted is to search for more ‘manageable’ units through which to trace 
the exchanges and reciprocities that we broadly agree form the agenda of 
global history. There have been two main techniques. The first is regional. 
Perhaps influenced originally by the example of Braudel, the most popular 
‘regions’ have been maritime. Rather than states or empires, it is (in the early 
modern world at least) maritime connections that bind peoples together. 
Thus we have the ‘Atlantic world’ to replace the ‘old story’ of Europe’s 
colonization of the Americas. There is an ‘Indian Ocean world’ in which the 
commercial and cultural centrality of India replaces the familiar Eurocentric 
version the heroic myth of Vasco da Gama. There is the vast Indo-Islamic 
panorama conjured up in Andre Wink’s al-Hind,4 and the Southeast Asian 
world so brilliantly realized in Anthony Reid’s The Lands Below the Wind.5 
The ‘Black Atlantic’ evokes the human and cultural traffic that bound Africa 
to the Americas after 1500: a traffic that was wider and deeper than the 
trades controlled by European merchants. The great attraction of this 
‘thalassology’ is in the way that it alerts us to the intensity of exchange and 
reciprocity or ‘connectivity’ between locations whose links were obscured, 
submerged or destroyed by the geographical template of European 
colonization and the shadow of a Eurocentric historiography. Perhaps its 
greatest pioneer was Jacob van Leur. But we need to be aware of the 
limitations and dangers that (as always) lie in wait for the most seductive 
kinds of enquiry. As the Canadian historian Ian Steele pointed out, in a 
scathing assessment of the ‘Atlantic world’ history championed by Bernard 
Bailyn (merely U.S.history writ large, said Steele), such maritime ‘worlds’ 
may serve to conceal the most important sources of political and cultural 
identity. ‘Atlantic world’ history that ignores the grip of the European 
empires is merely a flattering fiction. 
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It would be possible to say more than there is space for here about 
another kind of history, the history of commercial transactions in which the 
exchange of foodstuffs, luxuries, fabrics, warhorses and elephants (among 
many others) carried with them powerful cultural ‘messages’ and exerted 
subtle but sometimes profound effects on both partners involved. This kind 
of history can enormously deepen our knowledge of the kinds of exchanges 
with which global historians are especially concerned. It can challenge the 
‘big picture’ with which we try to make sense of the global past, but perhaps 
not replace it. 
To what kind of conclusion can we come to at last? It is, perhaps, 
that for some time (perhaps a long time) to come, anything resembling a 
comprehensive global history will continue to elude us. We will need to 
pursue the kinds of detailed inquiries that have been outlined above. We will 
need to think hard about the methodologies needed to relate the various 
spheres of human activity that we want to compare, and assess their 
importance (at various times) for preventing, limiting or promoting the 
‘Great Divergence’ – the core problem round which (as Kenneth Pomeranz 
rightly insists) global history must turn. Yet for the time being, at least, we 
still need a ‘big picture’ to make sense of our world: if historians don’t 
provide one, others will certainly do so. But we would be wise to 
acknowledge that any ‘big picture’ will be a provisional, impressionistic and 
personal essay, subject to sceptical scrutiny, and to be quickly replaced if a 
better model arrives. Meanwhile, before we make plans for the cat, we’ll 
have to catch it first. 
